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
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North Korean Cross-Border Activity, 1967

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1. KOREA

The sharp rise in Communist armed harassment and infiltration of South Korea in the past six months probably is intended to aggravate political tensions in the South and to expand subversive activity.

Domestic opposition to President Pak Chong-hui's government has claimed that sending Korean troops to Vietnam endangers South Korea's security. Pyongyang may believe that armed harassment will strengthen Pak's critics and discourage the deployment of additional South Korean troops to Vietnam. There are no indications, however, that North Korea intends to open a diversionary "second front" at this time.

Some of the North Korean armed incursions across the Military Demarcation Line this year have been more serious than in the past. Until recently incidents were concentrated in the US sector of the line, but in the last few weeks attacks against South Korean personnel have risen. Last fall North Korean forays provoked the South Koreans to make retaliatory raids against the North despite UN Command orders against such action.

Pyongyang has also stepped up agent infiltration. As many as 60 heavily armed men in nine teams are believed to be in remote areas of the South where they are attempting to recruit Communist sympathizers and to establish bases for future guerrilla activity. To support its clandestine effort, Pyongyang has expanded and improved its agent training program and is capable of turning out about 500 agents annually.

The South Koreans have organized, with US assistance, mobile teams to counter the infiltration. Some 10,000 military and civilian security personnel are involved in tracking down the agent teams. Given the growing scale of Pyongyang's efforts, harassment and agent infiltration will be continuing problems for South Korea. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY) (Map)

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5. PANAMA

President Robles moved swiftly last week to enlist support for the draft canal treaties as the first rumblings of opposition criticism began to be heard.

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Robles may have extracted promises of endorsement from newspaper moguls Gilberto and Harmodio Arias, both of whom have been adamant critics of the negotiations. Furthermore, Robles intends to appoint chief negotiator Diogenes de la Rosa to coordinate publicity favoring the treaties. The selection of De la Rosa, a prominent leftist intellectual, for this task appears to be a calculated bid for support from the leftists, and from the ultranationalists with whom they often collaborate.

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President Robles hopes to have the treaties ready later this month and visit Washington then for the formal signing.

Some opposition has come from the United Front-a group of political malcontents and ultranational-ists headed by Arnulfo Arias--which claims that the new treaties merely revise rather than abrogate the treaty of 1903. The somewhat subdued nature of Arias' reaction seems to confirm reports that he has not yet formulated definite plans for demonstrations or civil disturbances.

Arias' sudden departure for Europe on 1 July left his Panamenista Party aides disturbed and confused. Some sympathizers have accused him of "running out on his followers." Arias' withdrawal on the eve of the debate on the treaties could signal a hasty retreat from his earlier vows to oppose ratification. On the other hand, Arias may expect more sympathetic press coverage abroad for a campaign against the "illegality" of the government and the treaties it has negotiated. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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